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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to test the impact of financial statement disclosure on conservatism in Vietnamese financial statements. I use inter-earning 
announcement period returns and fiscal year returns to serve as economic news reflected in earnings during the financial statement disclosure period 
and prior to the financial statement disclosure period. I test conservatism in financial reporting of Vietnamese listed non-financial firms over the period 
of 2005-2015 using the two returns measures in succession. I find that conservatism principle is only ensured within the audited financial statement 
disclosure period. The findings have implications for our understanding of the role of auditors as well as rules and regulations of financial statement 
disclosure in improving the quality of accounting information.
Keywords: Accounting, Accounting Information, Financial Reporting 
JEL Classifications: M40, M48
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the impact of financial reporting 
disclosures on conservatism, defined as the tendency of 
accountants to recognize bad news on a timelier basis than 
good news (Basu, 1997). Following Watts (2003), managers 
and auditors have incentives to exercise conservatism due 
to litigation risk aversion. Auditors’ involvement in the 
preparation of financial statements is like an important 
accounting information filter for investors. Because the audited 
financial statements provide financial information for their 
making business decisions, they are literally in need of the 
qualified accounting information. Investors are the public eyes 
observing auditors’ activities. They serve as the market forces 
to drive financial statements preparers to comply with rules 
and regulations of financial reporting. As a result, conservatism 
is predicted to be exercised in the period of audited financial 
statement disclosure. Moreover, Ball et al. (2003) state that, the 
lower the demand for disclosure in planning-oriented code-law 
countries, the less timeliness in incorporating economic income 
in accounting income. This indirectly implies that conservatism 
is unlikely to be ensured in these countries before financial 
reporting disclosure.
Vietnam is also a planning-oriented code-law country; 
therefore, financial statement disclosure is predicted to impact 
conservatism in financial reporting. I perform empirical tests on 
a sample of firm-year observations over the period of 2005-2015. 
The results show that conservatism is ensured in intra-financial 
statement disclosure period, consistent with Basu (1997). On 
the other hand, I find that Vietnamese firms are inclined not to 
comply with conservatism in financial reporting unless auditors 
are involved in preparing financial statements. This supports 
the important role of auditors, as well as rules and disclosure 
regulations of financial reports in improving the quality of 
accounting information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the definition of 
conservatism and hypothesis. Section 3 explains research design. 
Section 4 presents sample selection procedures and summary 
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statistics. Section 5 provides results and conclusions are reached 
in Section 6.
2. DEFINITION OF CONSERVATISM AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Basu (1997) states conservatism as denoting the accountants’ 
tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize 
good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. He 
is also the first researcher who suggests the seminal model 
testing conservatism in financial reporting. In particular, he tests 
asymmetric news recognition timeliness specification. He uses 
inter-announcement period returns and fiscal year returns to 
measure economic news reflected asymmetrically in earnings. The 
inter-announcement period return is calculated to end 3 months 
after fiscal year with the purpose of ruling out the market response 
to prior year’s earnings. Fiscal year return is used as an alternative 
to exclude the market reaction to the current year’s earnings 
announcement. Negative returns serve as proxies for bad news 
and positive returns serve proxies for good news. Although, 
Basu’s tests (1997) of conservatism using different economic news 
measures primarily aim to check the robustness of the model, the 
results imply the difference in conservatism between the intra-
earnings announcement period1 and the period occurring before 
earning announcement.
Following Basu (1997), Watts (2003) defines conservatism 
as the asymmetrical verification requirements for gains and 
losses. He suggests that conservatism’ existence is explained 
by contracting motivation, tax optimization, litigation risk and 
regulatory demands. Auditors have incentives to force managers 
to report conservative values for earnings and net assets due to 
the pressure of the expected litigation costs. In addition, financial 
statements mostly are audited and disclosed at the end of annual 
fiscal period; therefore, firms have to work with auditors in the 
preparation of financial statements in 3 months after fiscal year. 
The interval of 3 months after fiscal year is the regulated period of 
financial statement disclosure for Vietnamese public companies2. 
Auditors’ participation in the preparation of financial statements 
probably leads to conservatism assurance in the financial statement 
disclosure period.
Ball et al. (2003) uses fiscal year returns (proxy for economic 
news) to conduct a test of news recognition timeliness in the code-
law countries. The findings indirectly show that conservatism 
in these countries is not warranted due to the lower demand for 
disclosure. Vietnam is a code-law country; therefore, the impact 
of financial statement disclosure on conservatism is an empirical 
question. The hypothesis regarding the role of auditors as well 
as regulations of financial statement disclosure in enforcing 
Vietnamese firms to exercise conservatism in financial reporting 
is stated in null form.
1 From a disclosure perspective, inter-announcement period returns are called 
intra-financial statement disclosure period returns measuring economic 
news recognized in accounting income with auditors’ involvement.
2 Circular 155/2015/TT-BTC dated 6th, October, 2015 regarding information 
disclosure on securities markets.
H
0
: There is no difference in the level of conservatism between 
the audited financial statement disclosure period and the period 
occurring before audited financial statement disclosure.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Measurement of Conservatism
I test conservatism with its asymmetric news recognition 
timeliness specification. First off, I estimate the following pooled 
cross-sectional regression of beginning-of-fiscal-year price 
deflated accounting earnings (Eit/Pt−1) on concurrent stock returns 
(Rit) to examine the timeliness of accounting earnings in response 
to economic news:
E
P
Rit
it
it it
−
= + +
1
0 0α β ε
 (1)
The timeliness of earnings with respect to economic news 
implies a positive slope coefficient (β
0
). Next, we conduct the 
regression separately for negative stock returns (“bad news”) 
sample and positive stock returns (“good news”) sample in 
succession. Conservatism implies the higher R2 (adjusted R2) of 
the regression for “bad news” sample than that for “good news” 
sample: That is, earnings are timelier in recognizing “bad news” 
than “good news.”
Alternatively, conservatism is examined by the pooled cross-
sectional regression of beginning-of-fiscal-year price deflated 
accounting earnings on concurrent stock return with dummy 
variable (Dit), which equals one for negative stock returns (“bad 
news”), zero otherwise.
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The asymmetric timeliness of earnings in respect of stock returns 
implies positive slope coefficients, β
0
 and β
1
: That is the sensitivity 
of earnings to “bad news” (β
0 
+ β
1
) is greater than that to “good 
news” (β
0
). The interactive slope coefficient (β
1
) measures the 
difference in the sensitivity of earnings to “bad news” and “good 
news.”
3.2. Measurement of Economic News
I use fiscal returns to measure economic news captured before 
financial statement disclosure. On the other hand, returns 
calculated to end 3 months after fiscal year are proxies for 
economic news purified by auditors. It is named intra-financial 
statement disclosure period returns.
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The sample is obtained from financial statements of non-financial 
firms listed on Hochiminh Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock 
Exchange over the period from 2005 to 2015. Earnings and 
stock returns, measured per share, are deflated by beginning-of-
fiscal-year stock price to control heteroskedasticity. In addition, 
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I use White standard errors (1980) to compute t-statistic, called 
heteroskedasitcity-robust t statistic. I exclude observations falling 
in the top or bottom 1% of beginning-of-fiscal-year deflated 
earnings and stock returns to avoid the potential influence of 
outliers on the regression results.
Table 1 demonstrates descriptive statistics of key variables. 
Average and median of earnings per share are 14% and 11% 
of the opening stock price. Average and median of intra-
financial statement disclosure period returns are 14% and 0%. 
The considerable difference between mean and median makes 
the distribution of intra-financial statement disclosure period 
returns sample skewed, whereas the distribution of fiscal 
returns sample is less skewed because average and median of 
fiscal returns are 19% and 11%, respectively. In Panel B of the 
Table 1, I decompose the full sample into positive stock return 
sub-sample (“bad news”) and negative stock return sub-sample 
(“bad news”) on intra-financial statement disclosure period basis. 
The good news sample contains 1216 observations with average 
beginning-of-fiscal-year deflated earnings per share and average 
stock return of 19% and 56%, respectively. The bad news sample 
contains 1177 observations with average beginning-of-fiscal-
year deflated earnings per share and average stock return of 9% 
and −29%, respectively. The Pearson correlation coefficient of 
beginning-of-fiscal-year deflated earnings per share and stock 
return is largely higher in “bad news” sample than in “good news” 
sample. It implies that earnings are likely to be more sensitive 
to “bad news” than “good news.” In Panel C, I disaggregate the 
sample into positive fiscal returns sub-sample (“good news”) 
and negative fiscal returns sub-sample (“bad news”). The results 
are quite similar to those of Panel B except Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The tiny difference in the Pearson correlation 
coefficient of earnings and fiscal returns between “bad news” 
and “good news” implies that there is no asymmetric sensitivity 
of earnings to economic news.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of the regression of earnings 
on intra-financial statement disclosure period returns. Row (1) 
shows the pooled adjusted R2 of regression (1) of 25.49%, which 
is substantially greater than the code-law sample R2 of 4.63%3. The 
estimated slope coefficient of 0.1 on stock returns is significantly 
positive at the 1% confidence level. This indicates that Vietnam 
has very high timeliness. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings can be 
derived from the difference in adjusted R2s of separate regressions 
(1) between the positive return sub-sample and negative return 
sub-sample found in row (2) and row (3). R2 of the negative 
return sample (16.48%) is greatly higher than that of the positive 
return sample (6.46%). This indicates that earnings are more 
sensitive to bad news than good news. Moreover, the asymmetric 
sensitivity of earnings to economic news is revealed by the results 
of regression (2) given in row (4). The sensitivity of earnings to 
good news and bad news are 0.062 and 0.166 (0.062 + 0.104), 
which are significant at 1% confidence level. Taken together, the 
results suggest the existence of conservatism within the period of 
audited financial statement disclosure.
Panel B reports the regression results of earnings on fiscal returns. 
Although the timeliness of earnings is still showed with the high 
adjusted R2 of regression (1) of 24.46% and the significantly 
positive slope coefficient of 0.085, there is no empirical evidence 
of asymmetric news recognition timeliness. R2 of the positive fiscal 
return sub-sample of 10.31% is higher than that of the negative fiscal 
return sub-sample (8.28%). The asymmetric gain and loss recognition 
timeliness, as measured by the slope coefficient (R × D) of 0.012, 
is insignificant. Consistent with Ball et al. (2003), Vietnam as well 
as Asian countries have no conservatism in accounting earnings in 
the period occurring before audited financial statement disclosure.
3 Common-law statistics from Ball et al. (2000).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Panel A: Full sample – 2393 observations
Variable Mean Standard deviation 1st quantile Median 3rd quantile
E 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.19
Intra R 0.14 0.56 −0.28 0 0.44
Fiscal R 0.19 0.63 −0.24 0.11 0.54
Panel B: Positive intra‑financial statement disclosure period returns (“good news”) versus negative intra‑financial statement disclosure 
period returns (“bad news”)
Good news Bad news
Observations 1,216 1,177
Mean E 0.19 0.09
Median E 0.17 0.07
Mean R 0.56 −0.29
Median R 0.44 −0.28
Pearson correlation 0.26 0.41
Panel C: Positive fiscal returns (“good news”) versus negative fiscal returns (“bad news”)
Observations 1.401 992
Mean E 0.17 0.08
Median E 0.15 0.07
Mean R 0.58 −0.36
Median R 0.43 −0.31
Pearson correlation 0.32 0.29
E is beginning-of-fiscal-year deflated earnings, R is stock returns. Fiscal R is fiscal returns. Intra R is intra-financial statement disclosure period returns
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper tests the impact of financial statement disclosure 
on conservatism in financial reporting in Vietnam using the 
sample over the period of 2005-2015. I find that asymmetric 
news recognition timeliness is statistically significant in the 
period of audited financial statement disclosure, whereas the 
reverse is for the period before financial statement disclosure. In 
sum, conservatism is only exercised as auditors involve in the 
preparation of financial statements and Vietnamese firms comply 
with the regulations of financial statement disclosure. The results 
provide the financial reporting standard setters and law-makers 
some implications of rules and regulations to improve the quality 
of accounting information.
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Table 2: Asymmetric news recognition timeliness 
Regression (1): Eit/Pit−1 = α0 + β0Rit
....................................................(+)
Regression (2): Eit/Pit−1 = α0 + α1Dit + β0Rit + β1RitDit
..................................................................(+)......(+)
Sample α0 α1 β0 β1 Adjusted 
R2 (%)
Panel A: Intra-financial statement 
disclosure period returnsa
(1) 0.123 (70.93)*** 0.1 (23.26)*** 25.49
(2) Rit≥0
1.216 obs
0.15 (31.25)*** 0.062 (8.51)*** 6.46
(3) Rit<0
1.177 obs
0.135 (31.71)*** 0.166 (16.02)*** 16.48
(4) 0.15 (31.25)*** −0.016 (−2.45)** 0.062 (8.51)*** 0.104 (8.2)*** 27.78
Panel B: Fiscal year returnsb
(1) 0.12 (70.04)*** 0.085 (22.22)*** 24.46
(2) Rit≥0
1.401 obs
0.133 (32.15)*** 0.072 (10.69)*** 10.31
(3) Rit<0
992 obs
0.114 (28.45)*** 0.083 (10.97)*** 8.28
(4) 0.13 (32.14)*** −0.018 (−3.27)*** 0.072 (10.69)*** 0.012 (1.16) 24.86
Eit is earnings per share for firm i at year t, Pit-1 is stock price per share of the beginning day of fiscal year t, 
aRit is stock return for firm i over the period from 9 months before fiscal 
year-end t to 3 months after fiscal year-end t, Dit is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if Rit<0, =0 otherwise. 
bRitis fiscal year return. The dummy variable is redefined to match the adjustment of 
Rit. ***Significant at 1% confidence level, **Significant at 5% confidence level. Heteroskedascity-robust t-statistic is indicated in parentheses below estimated coefficients
